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From 1931 to 1938, the problem of unemployment 
occupied the mind of every American policymaker. Each 
Presidential request and Congressional vote was focused 
on industrial recovery and putting the millions of 
unemployed Americans back to work. Roosevelt, through 
his many New Deal programs, was able to substantially 
decrease the number of men and women out of work. When 
Roosevelt took office in 1933, the unemployment rate 
stood at approximately 25% and as he began his second 
term, that number had dropped to 14%. This decrease 
was due primarily to federal programs, such as the 
Works Progress Administration and the Civilian 
Conservation Corps, as well as a minor upswing in the 
business cycle. Unfortunately, New Deal programs 
enjoyed only limited success and the problem of 
unemployment was not completely solved until 1942, when 
the huge deficit expenditures on armaments and 
munitions drove the unemployment rate below 3 %. 
Between January of 1937 when Roosevelt began his 
second term and February of 1941 when the first 
appropriations were made for the Lend-Lease Act, 





















years prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the problem 
of unemployment faded from the national agenda due to 
the controversy rising between the isolationists who 
were opposed to any involvement in European affairs and 
those in favor of a mobilization effort to prepare the 
United States for war. The attention of the Roosevelt 
administration was gradually turned from domestic to 
international concerns. 
The problem of unemployment during the years that 
separate the major New Deal programs and the beginning 
of World War II has been overlooked by historians. 
This period of time was one of transition for the 
American economy, especially after the recession of 
1938. Most scholarly work has focused on the New Deal, 
which preceded the 1937-1941 time period, or the war 
years that followed it. The period from March of 1937 
to February of 1941 presents many interesting questions 
regarding the goals and intentions of the Roosevelt 
administration. Roosevelt was faced with a difficult 
situation. He was unable to emphasize domestic 
programs because much of his attention was focused on 
the problems arising on the international scene, yet 





















of the isolationist movement. Exploring the public 
policies of this period will provide an insight to the 
causes of the high unemployment levels and any methods 
used to combat the problem, as well as focus attention 
on the politics of the era. 
The following essay will examine what type of 
public policy, if any, was pursued to combat the high 
levels of unemployment that plagued the American 
economy from early 1937 until the signing of the Lend-
Lease Act in 1941. The writer will attempt to explain 
why Roosevelt failed to bring unemployment to a more 
acceptable level during these years. The following 
chapters include detailed analysis of federal relief 
programs, the isolationist movement, fiscal and 






















RISE OF FEDERAL RELIEF 
In March of 1933, nearly 13 million Americans --
about one quarter of the labor force --were desperately 
seeking jobs. The nation had put its hope in the newly 
elected President, Franklin Roosevelt. On the day of 
his inauguration, doors of every American bank were 
locked. The system of providing for the unemployed was 
near collapse. Many were questioning whether 
capitalism would survive this crisis and one cannot 
understate the need for action. The New Deal launched 
a series of experiments in agriculture, industrial, 
commercial and monetary policy. These programs were 
addressed both to the immediate task of recovery and to 
the larger task of reconstruction. With private aid 
exhausted, the only hope for the millions of unemployed 
was a federal relief program. 
The first priority was the banking system. Before 
any other problems could be addressed, it was 
imperative to restore confidence in the financial 
system. Roosevelt attacked the problem by calling a 
special session of Congress and declaring a bank 
holiday. The Administration bought themselves time in 





















system. On March 9, five frenzied days after the 
inauguration, Congress convened, and was presented with 
emergency banking legislation. Debate was limited in 
both the House and Senate chambers, and within a few 
hours, the bill was passed and sent on to the White 
House. The urgency of the situation was obvious from 
the extraordinary speed and decision with which 
Congress had acted. 
The Emergency Banking Act of 1933 was the first in 
a wave of ideas and programs flowing from the executive 
branch in the first 100 days of the new administration. 
The banking legislation was followed by the 
establishment of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), 
a program designed to put young people back to work. 
The Federal Emergency Relief Act (FERA) set up a 
national relief system to rescue the failing private 
system. FERA was the first effort to provide jobs for 
the unemployed. An attempt to meet the needs of the 
agricultural population was made through the 
Agriculture Adjustment Act, the Emergency Farm Mortgage 
Act and the Far m Credit Act. The Truth- in- Securities 
Act and the Glass - Steagall Banking Act addressed 





















2). In the first 100 days, virtually all troubled 
areas of the economy were touched by the Federal 
government, including the overwhelming problem of 
unemployment. 
A substantial attempt to reduce unemployment was 
also made when the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(NIRA) was passed in June of 1933. This two - part 
program provided both for a system of industrial self-
government under federal supervision and for a $3.3 
billion public works program (Schlesinger, 21, vol. 2). 
The goal of this program was to put people back to work 
and to raise purchasing power by limiting working hours 
and increasing wages. 
Although NIRA had many problems and was not 
popular with businessmen who hated the collective 
bargaining provision, it provided a psychological 
stimulus to the American population. Working 
conditions were improved and, more importantly, new 
jobs were created. The $3.3 billion appropriation 
established the Public 
Works Administration (PWA) under Title II of the NIRA 
(Schlesinger, 99, vol. 2). Initiating its own 





















grants to states and other bodies to stimulate non -
federal construction. Urban improvement programs such 
as sewage systems, gas and electrical plants, schools 
and courthouses sought to reduce the unemployed ranks 
of the population. The PWA also undertook naval 
rebuilding projects. It also helped to modernize more 
than 50 military airports, gave planes to the Air Corps 
and improved 32 Army posts. In 1935, however, PWA's 
direct contribution to defense came to an end when 
Congress, on the demand of Senator Borah of Idaho, 
expressly forbade the use of appropriations for any 
type of military or naval materials (Schlesinger, 288, 
vol. 2). PWA alone could not eliminate the 
unemployment problem, but it left behind a wonderfully 
improved situation. 
In 1935, Roosevelt decided to refocus the relief 
efforts and create a new agency. The PWA was employing 
nearly half - a - million people on socially desirable 
projects. The problem was that the Ickes 
administration was often too slow and meticulous for 
Roosevelt's liking. The President wanted speed, 
flexibility and quick re-employment. The new agency, 
Works Progress Administration, would be funded through 
7 
FERA and undertake lighter public works projects that 
required less planning and administrative delays than 
the PWA projects. Ickes felt the accomplishments of 
his organization were being disregarded and conflicts 
arose over which agency would lead the relief effort. 
After a heated political struggle of personalities, 
involving Ickes, PWA Administrator and Hopkins, the new 
WPA Administrator, the Works Progress Administration 
(WPA) emerged as the primary agency in the fight 
against unemployment. Relief appropriations for that 
year totaled $4.8 billion, of which PWA received only 
$500 million (Schlesinger, 349, vol. 3). Roosevelt's 
goal was to employ as many men as possible from the 
relief roles at the lowest cost possible. A month's 
employment on WPA cost only $82, whereas employment for 
the same period on PWA cost the government $330 
(Schlesinger, 349, vol. 3). Over the next eight years, 
the WPA received a total of $11.4 billion in 
appropriations and gave work and wages to approximately 
8.5 million people (Sitkoff, 73). 
The WPA, under Hopkins' guidance, assumed 
coordination responsibilities for the 40 other relief 





















saying the two agencies would work side- by- side, but by 
the end of 1935, PWA, and Ickes, had been phased out of 
all decision- making areas. WPA would now oversee all 
work programs and act as a filter for Congressional 
appropriations. After funding WPA- sponsored projects, 
Hopkins distributed remaining funds to the various 
agencies, including PWA. 
In 1943, when WPA was dismantled, Roosevelt 
claimed "It has added to the national wealth," he said 
"it has repaired the wastage of depression, and has 
strengthened the country to bear the burden of war." 
Roosevelt's words imply the important role the WPA 
played in maintaining the moral and work ethic of the 
citizens. Although the unemployment rate was still as 
high as 14 % in early 1941, the WPA did have a positive 
impact on American workers. Without such programs, the 
United States would have lost many strong, able people 
to poverty and hunger. 
This overview of the major relief legislation will 
provide the basis for a detailed examination of the 
public policy towards unemployment from 1937-1941. The 
complexity of relief problems arose in part from the 





















relief, variations of individual needs and fluctuations 
in public attitudes. The following chapter will 
describe the numerous "alphabet agencies" whose relief 























In addition to the major relief efforts described, 
the first stage of Roosevelt's New Deal entailed a host 
of alphabet agencies designed to meet the needs of the 
unemployed. Some targeted specific groups such as 
young people, while others provided assistance to the 
unemployed. The NYA, CCC, CWA and Social Security Act 
attempted to reduce the hardship of the unemployed, but 
none of these organizations were designed to actually 
decrease the unemployment rate. 
The National Youth Administration (NYA) and the 
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) were organizations 
developed to meet the needs of American youth. In the 
days prior to mechanization, a youth with strength and 
ambition had little difficulty finding employment. 
Gradually, in both agriculture and manufacturing, human 
strength was replaced with machines (Meriam, 428). 
Education assumed increased importance as a factor in 
distinguishing individuals for available employment. 
The depression years intensified the problems. Young 
people were being forced from school to help support 
themselves and their families, yet without an adequate 





















federal government recognized the importance of 
educated youth and set up organizations such as the NYA 
and CCC to allow these young people to remain in 
school. 
The NYA, a subsidiary of the WPA, gave employment 
on work projects to 2.5 million out-of-school youth 
aged 16 to 25, and funded part-time work projects that 
allowed 2 million young people to remain in school. 
NYA employed college students in museums, libraries and 
laboratories. The program allowed many high-school-age 
youth to remain in school who otherwise would have been 
forced to look for work to help support their families. 
NYA benefits were not intended to do more than 
cover part of the youth's own expenses. Nevertheless, 
these meager wages meant the family income was not 
spread as thin as it otherwise would have been. Limits 
were set as to the maximum amount that could be earned 
by students in a month. When the programs first went 
into effect, the monthly limits were as follows: high-
school students, $6.00; college students, $20.00; and 






















The NYA continued to assist students until 1943. 
At that time the agency was dissolved, for all 
resources were needed to help in the war effort and 
there were ample opportunities for employment. 
During his first month in office, President 
Roosevelt signed the executive order establishing the 
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), the longest-lived 
New Deal unemployment relief program (Sitkoff, 70). In 
its first months, the CCC enrolled 250,000 young men 
aged 17 to 23 and put them to work on reforestation, 
soil conservation and similar projects in parks and 
forests at approximately 1,400 camps across the United 
States. These men received $30 a month, $25 of which 
was allotted to dependents, plus food, shelter, 
clothing, and medical attention . After the program had 
been in operation some time, opportunities for general 
educational and vocational training were also made 
available. 
When the program came to an end in June 1942, more 
than 2.5 million youth had served in the CCC; 
enrollment hit a peak of 500,000 in August 1935 and a 




I more young men entered the Corps each year than entered 
colleges and universities as freshmen (Sitkoff, 71). 
Neither the NYA nor the CCC had any real effect on 
the unemployment rate. Both programs took young people 
out of the labor force, the NYA by allowing students to 
remain in school rather than seeking employment, and 
the CCC by putting young men to work in conservation 
camps. One might say by withholding potential workers 
from the labor force, these organizations indirectly 
helped keep unemployment from increasing further. 
In November 1933, Roosevelt announced the 
establishment of the Civil Works Administration (CWA), 
a branch of the Federal Emergency Relief Act. The 
program was intended to take approximately four million 
people off relief, at least during the winter of 1933 -
1934. The CWA was in operation for only four months, 
during which almost 180,000 construction projects were 
created. The total cost of the CWA was just under one 
billion, nearly 80% of which went for wages (Sitkoff, 
7 2) • 
Although the 1935 Social Security Act did nothing 
to directly reduce the unemployment rate, certain 
portions of the Act did affect unemployed Americans. 
14 
The Social Security Act provided incentives to states 
to establish unemployment insurance programs which met 
certain standards and conditions. Each state adopted a 
program approved under the Social Security Act, yet 
there was a wide variation among the states with 
reference to specific provisions. In general, the 
unemployment insurance program could be summarized as 
follows: the Federal government imposed a tax on all 
industrial and commercial employers of four or more; if 
the states levied taxes to support an approved state 
plan, such state taxes were credited against a portion 
f the Federal tax; each state was free to establish its 
own program if it complied to certain Federal 
requirements; the portion of the tax which was remitted 
to the Federal government was placed in the general 
revenues. The state taxes were placed in state reserve 
funds in the Federal Treasury. From these funds, the 
states made weekly payments to unemployed persons for 
periods generally ranging from 26 to 39 weeks in 
varying amounts (Schottland, 80-81). 
Although the states had certain general patterns 
of coverage because of provisions in the Federal law, 
there was great variation in eligibility for benefits 
15 
and benefit amounts, since each state was free to 
determine the eligibility requirements and the amount 
of compensation. Generally, for a person to be 
eligible for unemployment insurance benefits, he/she 
must be unemployed, able and available for work, and 
actively seeking such work. In addition, the person 
must not have left a job voluntarily, been discharged 
for misconduct, be unemployed because of a strike, 
lockout or other labor dispute, or have refused any 
offer for suitable employment (Schottland, 84). To be 
eligible for benefits, a worker must also show that 
he/she was employed in covered employment for the 
required length of time, called the "base period", or 
have earned a minimum amount in that period, or both. 
Unemployed workers' eligibility for unemployment 
insurance was affected by their eligibility for WPA 
employment. Unemployed workers who were eligible to 
receive unemployment compensation benefits were 
normally ineligible for WPA employment, both during the 
waiting period and during the period for which benefits 
are payable. Early in 1942, however, federal policy 
was revised and workers were allowed WPA employment 












benefits (Howard, 435). Prior to this change, workers 
who were forced to accept unemployment compensation 
benefits, rather than allowed WPA jobs, received a 
stipend which normally amounted to only about half a 
worker's usual wages. In a survey of the period June 
to August 1939, figures show unemployment benefits 
below the average WPA wages in all but three states 
(Howard, 440). 
As noted earlier, these programs had little or no 
effect on the actual unemployment rate. Academic 
literature indicates that programs, such as NYA, CCC 
and unemployment insurance, were intended mainly as a 
psychological stimulus to the nation's young people, 
the generation that would eventually lead the country 
to a position of world power. This is not to say that 
efforts were not being taken to reduce unemployment, 
but there were several strong forces working against 




















THE EROSION OF ISOLATIONISM: 1936 - 1941 
In addition to the emergency legislation and New 
Deal federal programs, another force was helping to 
shape domestic relief efforts. After World War I, 
government leaders pledged a foreign policy of 
isolationism. During the decade separating the war and 
the stock market crash of 1929, Americans adhered 
strictly to isolationist sentiments. This policy was 
strengthened by the crash and the ensuing depression. 
Many believed that solutions to the economic downturn 
could be found only at home. Government leaders 
intended to focus their attentions and the country's 
resources on economic recovery. 
Towards the end of Roosevelt's first term, his 
speeches began to indicate a renewed concern with 
foreign affairs. His remarks regarding events in 
Europe had to be kept to a minimum because of the 
historically strong isolationist feelings. Roosevelt 
slowly tried to move the nation away from such adamant 
isolationist attitudes. 
In the mid - 1930s, isolationism played a major role 
in shaping America's foreign policy. Approval of the 
Neutrality Act in 1935 strengthened the isolationist 
18 
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movement. The Act severely limited the powers of the 
executive branch to take action quickly as situations 
arose. President Roosevelt, shortly after the 
Neutrality Act was in place, remarked that the 
difficulty of predicting future events warranted a more 
flexible program and that the strict provisions of the 
Neutrality Act might drag us into war rather than 
keeping us out, yet he still had to operate within this 
framework (Beard, 166). 
Until 1936, Roosevelt supported the Neutrality 
Act. Up to this point the President's messages and 
speeches contained virtually no reference to foreign 
affairs. Roosevelt's address to Congress in January of 
1936 took a sharp turn towards acknowledging the 
tensions rising across the Atlantic (Beard, 167). The 
foreign policy of the next five years would evolve 
within the framework of a gradual evolution of public 
opinion in the United States away from isolationism. 
In early 1937, buoyed by the 1936 election, 
Roosevelt publicly announced no reversal of his 
neutrality policy with regard to European affairs, yet 
he took actions which, to Congressional leaders and 





















increased intervention in foreign affairs. Examples of 
this shift are evident in his policies toward the 
Spanish Civil War and the Sino-Japanese War (Beard, 
181). By October of 1937, the President could no 
longer advocate neutrality. In an address on the world 
situation in Chicago, the President formally disavowed 
the doctrine of neutrality and espoused collective 
security (Beard, 187). 
Despite the implications of the Chicago address, 
Roosevelt made no changes in foreign policy during the 
remainder of 1937. Internationalists charge that 
strong isolationist sentiments in Congress were 
responsible for the lack of immediate action. It 
appears that Roosevelt, realizing the severity of the 
European situation, sought mainly to prepare the 
country for necessary changes in the future. 
In January of 1938, Roosevelt sent a special 
message to Congress calling for an increase in naval 
armaments and for legislation aimed at preventing 
profiteering in war time (Beard, 212). Isolationists 
viewed this proposal as a means to underwrite or 
implement the principles set forth in the Chicago 
speech. After prolonged debate, the Naval 
20 
Authorization bill passed, but isolationists in 
Congress blocked the war profiteering sections, as well 
as those for establishing universal military service. 
These events, meager as they seem today, were the sum 
total of the 1938 foreign policy debate, leaving 
isolationism the predominant goal. 
Roosevelt began 1939 with emotional speeches 
emphasizing the need for greater preparedness for 
defense. He appealed to the public by claiming that 
foreign aggression was directly challenging American 
religious beliefs, democracy and international good 
faith. While European powers were embroiled in events 
which would lead to a general war, the subject of 
American neutrality and non-intervention became the 
storm center of a national controversy. The 
controversy turned on proposals to revise or abandon 
the Neutrality Act, particularly those sections placing 
an embargo on arms sales. In November, the embargo was 
repealed, but it was coupled with other amendments 
which materially strengthened the neutrality 
legislation. Not until Germany invaded Poland in 1939, 
did the Roosevelt Administration invoke real trade- war 





















permanently high important duties on its goods, using 
licenses and subsidies to force American firms to break 
their ties with German firms in the Balkans and Latin 
America, and taking over vital transportation and 
communication routes (Sitkoff, 190). The German 
invasion fueled isolationists' desire for neutrality. 
They believed any involvement at this point would lead 
to eventual deployment of American troops. 
Roosevelt was determined to support the allied 
nations of Europe against Nazi aggression. His task 
was to devise a plan for assistance the isolationists 
would support. In 1940 and 1941, Roosevelt was 
struggling for passage of the Lend- Lease Act, which 
would authori z e the United States to sell, lend, lease 
or transfer title of munitions to nations whose defense 
the President deemed vital to that of the United 
States. Roosevelt described the plan as a release of 
equipment tat wa snot vital to American defense and 
which would supposedly be returned after the war. His 
request fell on sympathetic ears; two months later 
Congress appropriated $7 billion for the Lend- Lease 
Program. Critics fought this bill on the grounds that 





















also questioned whether England was as desperate as she 
claimed to be, pointing to her enormous assets outside 
the United States that could be converted to dollars. 
They claimed the appropriated dollars could be put to 
more productive uses in the United States by assisting 
in the economic recovery or reducing the national debt. 
With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that had 
isolationists beliefs been shed earlier and the war 
efforts begun sooner, the unemployment problem could 
have been eliminated before 1942. Full employment was 
reached soon after the United States joined the war 
effort; therefore, one can assume the effect would have 
been the same regardless of when the defense buildup 
started. Isolationists believed that withholding 
financial aid from our European allies would allow for 
faster resolution of domestic problems, namely 
unemployment. The failed to see the benefits 





















FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES 
Between 1937 and 1941, the forces of fiscal and 
monetary powers were also affecting the rate of 
economic recovery and the unemployment rate. To 
understand the changes taking place during this period, 
we must briefly refer to the developments of the early 
1930s. 
Roosevelt had formulated no definite fiscal 
policies before becoming President. His main goal, he 
claimed during the 1932 election, was to put the 
government's financial house in order. Roosevelt 
excoriated Hoover repeatedly for his budget deficits 
and the subsequent threat to the government's credit. 
Despite Roosevelt's commitment to a balanced budget, 
there were deficits every year of his Presidency. The 
deficits were incurred primarily because he valued so 
highly the benefits of the work programs for which 
expenditures were increased. 
It is significant that tax rates were never 
decreased under Roosevelt; in fact, they were increased 
well before the end of the depression (Chandler, 252). 
Moreover, expenditure increases were undertaken 


















as the unemployed and farmers. There were some 
refe rences to their general contributions to incomes 
and purchasing power. However, expenditure increases 
were oriented towards specific relief programs, such as 
the WPA, and on a whole, were inadequate to raise 
aggregate demand to full employment levels. 
Fiscal policies of the late 1930s were not 
strongly expansionary in nature, and they did not help 
to lower the unemployment rate. Of course, fiscal 
policy could have been worse, had Roosevelt really 
tried to achieve an annually balanced budget. To 
achieve his goal, effective tax rates would have been 
raised and government expenditures decreased. 
In the monetary realm, of basic importance were 
the additions to the monetary base and improvements in 
the reserve position of the · banking system. The 
reserve position of the banking system was enhanced by 
the purchase of government securities by the Fed in 
1933. From 1933-1936, the Fed played a rather 
insignificant role in monetary policy. The government 
seized the initiative and took bold actions in the 
monetary area and many others. One of the greatest 




















gold stock was increased consistently from 1933 to 
1941. Further funds, almost $1 billion, were supplied 
by increases in outstanding Treasury currency; these 
resulted largely from Treasury purchases of silver for 
monetary purposes (Chandler, 255). These huge 
increases enabled banks to retire virtually all their 
borrowing at the Fed and to increase their total and 
excess reserves. 
Following these expansionary steps, the Fed re-
emerged as a player in monetary policy. The most 
controversial actions taken by the Fed during this 
period were its two increases of member bank reserve 
requirements. The first increase, which became 
effective on August 16, 1936, increased reserve 
requirements by 50%. The second increase, half of 
which became effective on March 1, 1937 and the other 
half on May 1, raised the requirements to the limit 
permitted by law (Chandler, 310). The purpose was to 
remove from the banking system some part of the excess 
reserves that were not currently being used, but which 
might later serve as a basis for undesired inflation. 
The first increase had no visible effect on monetary 





















continued to expand and interest rates continued 
downward. Yet it is probably true, as many have 
alleged, that the second increase played at least a 
minor role in precipitating the recession of 1937-1938. 
In retrospect, the increase of reserve 
requirements in the spring of 1937 was a mistake - - a 
mistake stemming from erroneous economic forecasting 
and an underestimate of the demands of the banking 
system for excess reserves. Interest rates rose almost 
immediately and security prices fell. Though the 
recession lasted only 13 months, it was severe. 
Industrial production and factory employment fell by at 
l e ast a quarter, eliminating virtually all recovery 
progress that had taken place. 
After the excess reserves had been severely 
reduced, the Fed began to ease restrictions. Late in 
1937, the discount rate was lowered and the regulations 
regarding Federal Reserves discounts and advances were 
liberali zed. Roosevelt announced recovery measures for 
1938 and requested a lowering of reserve requirements. 
The next day, April 15, 1938, the Board of Governors 
reduced reserve requirements against all classes of 





















million of excess reserves (Chandler, 330). These 
requirements remained unchanged until November 1941. 
It is difficult to say why the recovery was 
disappointingly slow and incomplete. There were many 
public policy vehicles working towards the same 
ultimate goal, but they unfortunately had opposing 
intermediate effects. The unemployment rate was 
influenced, either directly or indirectly, by monetary 
and fiscal policies, the isolationist movement and most 
importantly, the federal relief efforts. From the 
beginning of the Roosevelt Presidency, federal work 
programs were the mainstay of efforts aimed at reducing 
unemployment. The WPA, although not established until 
1935, was the leader of the federal work programs. It 
was more successful in providing jobs for the 













THE WPA: 1937 - 1941 
Efforts to reduce unemployment began almost 
immediately after Roosevelt took office in 1933. 
During the first hundred days, the Federal Emergency 
Relief Administration was established by a bill which 
passed the Senate by a vote of 55 to 17 and the House 
three weeks later by 316 to 42 (Schlesinger, 265, vol. 
2). Under the direction of Harry Hopkins, the program 
began with $500 million for grants-in-aid to states. 
In 1935, Roosevelt set up a new agency known as 
the Works Progress Administration, which was basically 
the FERA renamed. Roosevelt made this transformation 
because he believed the current program, PWA, had 
become inefficient. Roosevelt had lost confidence in 
Ickes, Administrator of the PWA, and wanted to move him 
to a position with less responsibility. 
Before the transformation took place, there were 
several other forces combating unemployment. A section 
of the National Industrial Recovery Act provided $3.3 
billion for the establishment of a works program. The 
PWA originated under this appropriation. Programs such 
as the CCC and NYA also had minor effects on the 





















people from the work force, thereby preventing a 
further rise in unemployment. The PWA and the WPA 
undertook similar sorts of work projects. Neither 
program eliminated the unemployment problem, but the 
WPA enjoyed more success than the PWA, mainly because 
they received larger amounts of money and Hopkins 
proved to be a more effective administrator than did 
Ickes. 
The Works Project Administration (or i ginally Works 
Progress Administration) was created in 1935 by an 
executive order from Roosevelt. WPA was intended to be 
a flexible, administrative agency whose chief role 
would be that of coordinator for other federal 
agencies, such as PWA, CCC, NYA and Bureau of Public 
Roads. Between 1935 and 1943, the WPA received more 
funds than any other agency, and consequently supplied 
more jobs than any other agency. 
The WPA was built upon a series of laws enacted by 
Congress. Each year, the WPA was appropriated funds 
through the Emergency Relief Acts. For this reason, 
WPA administrators were never able to plan for more 
than one year in the future. During its first six 
years, WPA had to ask Congress for money nine times to 
30 
continue its operations. Unemployment was being 
treated on an emergency basis, even though the problem 
had persisted for almost a decade. Critics urged the 
federal government to write into its permanent 
statutory legislation, a program for providing useful 
employment for the unemployed, rather than relying on 
yearly appropriations (Howard, 107). This would allow 
communities and states to develop more effective plans 
for the future. 
The WPA undertook a variety of projects, from the 
construction of highways to the extermination of rats. 
Construction and engineering projects accounted for 
75.2% of all the employment provided (Howard, 129). Of 
the construction and engineering projects, the most 
important in terms of number of workers employed were 
highways, roads and street projects. These types of 
projects accounted for 44% of all workers employed 
(Howard, 129). At different times during its 
existence, the WPA was forbidden to be involved in 
certain types of projects. In 1935, a prohibition 
against the use of work-related appropriations for 
munitions or war materials was included in the 
Emergency Relief Act. No such restrictions were 
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enforced again until 1939, when isolationist sentiments 
swept the country. Congressional battles emerged in 
1940 over this issue. Though their efforts were not 
successful, Congressional debate in 1940 and 1941 
clearly envisioned an increase in projects undertaken 
by WPA to further national defense. 
A further limitation, designed to prevent 
competition with free enterprise, was adopted in 1939. 
A clause was written into the 1939 Emergency Relief Act 
preventing the use of WPA funds for the purchase, 
establishment or expansion of factories or stores 
(Howard, 134). The intention was to keep WPA projects 
from interfering with the efforts of private industry. 
Some would say that production activity was the key to 
solving some problems associated with the federal work 
program (Howard, 134). The Administration had failed 
to solve the problem of unemployment after eight years 
of experimenting and observers gradually accepted the 
idea that it was time for production to be undertaken, 
even if this required adjustment on the part of private 
industry. WPA was subjected to various other 





















dealt with the size of the projects undertaken, others 
with sponsorship of projects. 
Conditions of eligibility for WPA jobs were 
modified many times during the life of the agency. 
Some changes in rules regarding eligibility have been 
more or less consistent through time. Year after year, 
the policies of Congress regarding the employment of 
aliens and the limiting of jobs to workers who are in 
need became more stringent. At the same time, Congress 
was allowing more veterans and their dependents on the 
WPA roles each year. The most basic requirements to be 
employed by the WPA were that the individual must be 
seeking work, willing to work, and available to work 
(Howard, 372). 
Since the primary purpose of the WPA was to 
provide jobs for unemployed workers, the number 
actually employed from month to month gauge the 
usefulness of the program (Exhibit 1). Upon 
examination of these numbers, four phases can be 
clearly identified, two of increasing employment and 
two of decreasing employment. The first phase was a 
period of expansion, which began in 1935, with the 


















1936. Here, the second phase began, employment fell 
steadily, with some minor comebacks, until September of 
1937. The third phase began in 1937 and ended in 
November of 1938 when WPA employment had reached an 
all - time high of just over three million jobs. From 
this point, WPA employment fell steadily until the end 
of 1941. 
The decline phase reflects the new emphasis on 
international policies, as well as the growing concern 
over the increasing deficit and proposals for a 
balanced budget. The phase of declining WPA employment 
began almost immediately after Roosevelt's famous 
Chicago speech where he disavowed the doctrine of 
neutrality and urged support for the Allies against 
German aggression. Though there was no immediate 
reversal of policy, markets began to sense war 
production possibilities, which meant new employment 
opportunities. Pressures for a balanced budget also 
promulgated the decline phase. After 1938, Roosevelt 
encountered many obstacles while trying to secure WPA 
funding. The country pulled out of the short, but 
severe recession, only to find itself faced with more 












There were many variables involved determining the 
number of WPA jobs provided in any given year. 
Congressional appropriations were the primary 
determinant. Before appropriations were made, the 
President would look at the likelihood of increases or 
decreases in private employment when requesting funds. 
Natural disasters such as floods, drought or hurricanes 
also affected requests for, and votes on, 
appropriations. Policymakers attempted to estimate 
publicly acceptable levels of spending and increases in 
the national debt. 
Because unemployment remained high and the economy 
sluggish until the United States mobilized for war, the 
general effect of the WPA is difficult to measure. In 
the opinion of one noted economist, Stanley Lebergott, 
the WPA, although not able to end unemployment, did 
provide a positive stimulus to increase investment and 
consumption and eventually, economic recovery. He 
claimed that even more important, WPA jobs helped keep 
the skills and attitudes of the unemployed from 
deteriorating completely (McJimsey, 113). 
As the depression years passed, administrators of 





















agency. In 1939, steps were taken in that direction by 
combining various relief programs into a Federal Works 
Agency. Actions taken reflect the growing belief that 
high unemployment rates were not a temporary crisis, 
but an unavoidable economic phenomenon. Soon 
afterwards, however, the United States entered World 
War II, and wartime prosperity ended the unemployment 
crisis. 
When Congress convened in January 1937, the 
President reminded the body that in a 1936 message he 
had warned the country that the $1.5 billion 
appropriated for work relief would prove sufficient 
only if industry would actively cooperate with 
government in reducing unemployment (Howard, 571). 
Roosevelt claimed that in some industries and among 
certain employers, that the maximum hour stipulation of 
the National Recovery Act, was being unreasonably 
increased. By failing to abide by this regulation, 
firms were denying jobs to unemployed Americans. This, 
along with the drought conditions in 1936, caused 
Roosevelt to request an additional $790 million to 
carry the works program from February 1937 to June 
1937. 
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In april, the President returned to Congress with 
a detailed proposal for initiating an economic upswing. 
The first measure of the proposal called for an 
increase in relief appropriations in fiscal year 1938. 
Roosevelt urged Congress to provide the WPA with $1.25 
billion for the first seven months of the year, in 
order to prevent the required cut back of WPA jobs 
effective July 1 at the current levels (Congressional 
Record, April 14, 1937, 5383). Recommendations 
regarding funds for NYA and CCC were also included in 
the proposal. All requests wee designed to prevent the 
layoff of those already receiving assistance. 
The sec ond measure requested that additional bank 
reserves be made available to the public. Roosevelt 
suggested that the reserve requirement be decreased and 
that approximately $1.4 billion in gold be changed to a 
spendable form. These actions would provide businesses 
with additional credit, so that they might expand 
operations and provide new employment opportunities. 
Roosevelt's final request called for the creation 
of new jobs and hence, an increase in purchasing power. 
This was to be accomplished through expenditures on 










next six months. The public works projects would 
involve both direct expenditures and loans for 
construction projects. Roosevelt ended his proposal by 
emphasizing the need for a "national will" to overcome 
unemployment. Government and private enterprise must 
join forces to eliminate the unemployment problem. 
The President's proposals met with some criticism 
by members of Congress. Debates in Congress charged 
Roosevelt's relief system as being uneconomical, that 
current relief policies had exhibited waste and 
extravagance, and that the President was building a 
permanent and expensive bureaucracy which only 
complicated and hindered the efforts to reduce 
unemployment (Congressional Record, May 21, 1937, 
4941). Some advocated the need for a drastic reduction 
in the number of persons receiving relief and 
elimination of unnecessary administration expenditures 
by relief agencies. Others suggested turning relief 
completely over to the states, claiming this was the 
only way to balance the budget. 
Arguments expounded on both sides of the issue. 
Another group in Congress urged, not reducing 




I tax system in order to fund the necessary programs, 
such as WPA. Debate continued throughout 1937 with no 
real resolution of a path for future government relief 
programs. October of 1937 brought with it a downturn 
in the economy. Policymakers watched the situation, 
hoping for a turn around. Early in 1938, it was 
evident the nation was experiencing an economic decline 
that required immediate action. 
In January of 1938, the chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Board, Marriner S. Eccles, testified before the 
Committee on Relief and Unemployment that only 
government intervention could stop the sharp and 
continued drop in consumer purchasing power (Stark, 
January 5, 1938, 1). He suggested that wage rates in 
the building industry were unjustifiably high and 
should be voluntarily lowered by labor in order to 
stimulate investment. Increased government spending 
and a compact between government, industry and labor 
for lower costs in the construction industry, according 
to Eccles, would go far towards ending the present 
recession. Although many legislators were working 
towards a balanced budget, Eccles told the Committee 











time, was by increasing taxes, a move that would only 
fuel the recession. 
As the year wore on, there was no improvement in 
the unemployment rates. Congress, in February, passed 
HJR 596, making an additional $250 million available 
for the relief process (Congressional Record, February 
21, 1938, 2210). The supplemental appropriation was to 
be used during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1938 to 
sustain the current number of WPA employees and add 
approximately 500,000 new positions. 
Shortly after the supplemental appropriation was 
in place, Congress began hammering out the details of a 
bill to carry the relief efforts through the final 
seven months of 1938. As in 1937, heated debates took 
place over the amounts and appropriate uses for the 
funds. Nineteen hundred and thirty-eight saw one new 
problem emerge. Groups inside and outside the 
legislature charged WPA with political activity and 
coercion of workers. Harry L. Hopkins, Director of the 
WPA, gave a national radio address denying accusations 
of any political activity within the relief 
organization. There was no conclusive evidence of 





















finalized version of the bill provided $1.425 billion 
to the WPA to provide an estimated 2.8 million jobs. 
The renewed support for WPA programs seemed to pay 
off during the last quarter of 1938. The economy saw 
an increase in residential construction and stable 
prices within the industry (Belair, 1). Hopkins 
predicted an early curtailment of WPA spending, leading 
to a permanent reduction because of continued 
improvements in business conditions. 
Between the time of the enactment of the 1938 
Emergency Relief Appropriations Act and the beginning 
of 1939, substantial business and industrial 
improvement occurred throughout the United States. The 
improvement was due partially to a reversal in Fed 
policy. In april of 1938, the Fed lowered reserve 
requirements at the request of President Roosevelt. 
Credit was more readily available for firms to borrow 
and bring displaced staff back to work or hire new 
workers. Beginning in July of 1938, 125,000 to 150,000 
workers were voluntarily leaving WPA projects each 
month for positions in private industry. 
Unfortunately, the vacant positions were sought by some 





















compensation benefits were exhausted (Congressional 
Record, January 5, 1938, 84). The WPA received $725 
million for unemployment relief, but Congress cut $150 
million from the original amount requested by President 
Roosevelt. This was the first time since the birth of 
the New Deal that a relief appropriation had been 
reduced by the House. 
One reason for Congress tightening the purse 
strings was the suspected political activities of the 
WPA. Evidence showed that the number of persons in WPA 
positions increased dramatically during election years 
It is difficult to say whether there was actually a 
corresponding increase in need at those times. State 
and local WPA administrators were suspected of coercive 
behaviors and misuse of federal funds. A great deal of 
legislation and code amendments were recommended to 
make political activity impossible. Charges of fraud, 
discrimination or other political behaviors were now 
punishable as felonies rather than misdemeanors. 
A second reason for Roosevelt's failure to secure 
the requested amount stems from the increased talk of a 
balanced budget. Many forces were at work during this 





















minds of legislators, than reduced government spending 
and a balanced budget. The first two weeks of the 
session indicated that unemployment was being viewed on 
a more permanent basis for the first time since the 
crisis began in the early 1930s. In order to 
accomplish this lofty goal, government was forced to 
look for more self-liquidating projects. 
The third, and probably most important, reason 
Congress rejected the additional appropriation dealt 
with the outbreak of war in Europe. Speculation 
abounded regarding the extent to which the war might 
alleviate the need for WPA programs (Howard, 573). 
Government leaders were forced to abandon isolationist 
views and consider what role the U.S. would play in the 
European conflict and the effect it would have on our 
economy. 
Battles in Congress during 1939 were very similar 
to those of previous years. Unemployment remained a 
grave problem across the country. Policymakers, 
frustrated by the failure of the past programs, were 
advocating a federal withdrawal from the area of 
relief. Many believed it was time to turn the 





















Roosevelt maintained his spend-lend policy of relief. 
For the fiscal year 1940, he recommended $1.477 billion 
be provided for the WPA, together with any balances of 
the appropriation for the current year which may remain 
on June 30, 1939 (Congressional Record, April 27, 1939, 
4842 - 4843). 
Nineteen hundred and forty brought few changes in 
the number of unemployed or the relief programs. As in 
previous years, the initial relief allocation was 
exhausted long before the end of the fiscal year. 
Roosevelt, again, was forced to go before Congress 
requesting additional funds to prevent extensive 
layoffs. Additional funds in the amount of $38 million 
were needed to avoid the WPA ranks being reduced to 1.5 
million people, from the current 2.3 million 
(Congressional Record, March 18, 1940, 3002). 
In May 1940, the isolationists exerted their 
strength and passed a resolution prohibiting the 
expenditure of 1941 relief funds for construction 
projects where the total estimated cost exceeded 
$50,000 (Congre s s ional Record, May 23, 1940, 6734). 
This measure was intended to discourage the use of 





















defense. In recent months, attempts had been made to 
filter WPA funds into defense-related projects. 
Critics charged this resolution would force the 
operation of numerous small projects of doubtful value. 
To this group, military expenditures appeared to be a 
likely solution to the unemployment problem. 
Isolationists responded that such spending would, at 
best, temporarily reduce the unemployment ranks, but 
could not be considered as a possible solution. 
In April of 1940, Representative Faddis of 
Pennsylvania, bluntly told his colleagues in the House 
that it was time to completely rethink the approach to 
unemployment relief. He exclaimed before the House 
that, "All the money that has been spent has left 
nothing permanent behind ... we have not devised any 
system whatsoever to make those who are unemployed, or 
on WPA, any more able to care for themselves than they 
were before this money was spent." Faddis added that, 
"We must solve the problem in a manner that does not 
fasten unemployment on the public payroll for their 
existence" (Congr essional Record, April 1, 1940, 3794). 
Across the country, Mr. Faddis was not the only 





















attempting to pinpoint the underlying cause of this 
persistent problem. John Younger, a professor of 
engineering at Ohio State University, claimed the major 
factor in the unemployment p r obl e m of the last ten 
years was population gains and immigration. His 
assertion was based on the fact that the number of 
persons employed in 1937 was equal to the number 
employed in 1929. He believed that taxation and 
restrictions placed on businesses by federal 
legislation were keeping employment down ("Lays Rise in 
Jobless to Population Gains," 20). 
Even President Roosevelt was searching for an 
attributable cause, hoping then to develop an adequate 
solution. In his January address to Congress, 
Roosevelt set forth the task facing the nation was to, 
"find jobs faster than invention takes them away" 
(Appendix to Congressional Record, January 18, 1940). 
The President stated that we had not yet found a way to 
employ the surplus labor which the efficiency and 
technology of industry had created. 
Representative Robinson of Kentucky recommended we 
begin at square one, with a comprehensive study to 





















high unemployment, its extent and its cure 
{Congressional Record, April 4, 1940, 4036). He 
condemned the spending of billions of dollars for the 
relief of those who were unemployed, when steps to 
reduce and end unemployment had been neglected. 
Another Congressman, Mr. Cannon of Missouri, 
believed the European conflict was preventing 
unemployment rates from dropping (Congressional Record, 
May 15, 1940, 4035 - 4036). Instead of accelerating 
employment, as many foresaw, the war depressed 
employment further according to Cannon. Every 
important market in Eastern Europe was closed to 
American commerce or was curtailed severely. Cannon 
saw no need to increase WPA spending, but only to 
maintain its current level, preventing any further 
layoffs. 
In the early part of 1940, many suggestions were 
offered regarding changes that were needed in relief 
programs, nevertheless, proposals for the 1941 program 
closely followed those of previous years. The 
legislature appropriated $975 million for the WPA. It 
was estimated that this amount would support only 





















March 18, 1940, 3002). In other words, 500,000 WPA 
workers would be released between July 1, 1940 and 
November 1, 1940. Private employment had not increased 
enough to absorb these people, so Congress allowed the 
appropriation to be spent in the first eight months of 
FY 1941, with the understanding that total relief funds 
would not exceed $1.3 billion. 
On March 11, 1941, President Roosevelt signed into 
law HR 1776, popularly known as the Lend-Lease Act. 
The bill, which made it possible for the U.S. to 
provide Great Britain with war materials, caused many 
people to re-evaluate the role of the federal works 
program. This ingenious bill allowed the U.S. to avoid 
directly funding Britain's war effort, as this was 
prohibited due to the fact Great Britain had defaulted 
on loans from World War I. Roosevelt also sensed an 
opportunity to set up production in U.S. factories, 
thereby reducing unemployment (Martel, 2). Passage of 
the Lend- Lease Act eliminated all hopes of remaining 
neutral in the European conflict and the unemployment 






















The 1937 - 41 period presents unique questions. 
Why, after almost a decade of effort, did the number of 
unemployed remain in the nine to ten million range? 
Did the actions of the Roosevelt Administration 
coincide with the goal of reducing unemployment? And, 
how successful were the programs used during this time? 
The research suggests three conclusions regarding the 
public policies undertaken. 
The first, a criticism of the public policy, 
involves the emphasis on relief rather than reduction 
of unemployment. Billions of dollars were spent 
between 1937 and 1941 on relief programs that failed to 
substantially combat unemployment in the five prior 
years. Portions of this money could have been spent to 
assist businesses in raising production and 
consequently, employment levels. Relief programs 
provided an artificial support that, no matter how 
generous and beneficial, would collapse if funds were 
cut. Business assistance, on the other hand, would 
have stimulated genuine economic recovery by increasing 
purchasing power. The fact that no direct correlation 





















WPA employment levels supports the conclusion of 
overspending and inefficiency in the work program. I 
contend, therefore, that at least a portion of this 
money could have been put to a more productive use in 
the form of loans and grants to businesses, which would 
have directly reduced unemployment. 
Second, despite some successes and some failures, 
the various measures comprising the New Deal during the 
years of experimentation did not bring economic 
prosperity or full employment. At best, Roosevelt 
sustained the hopes of millions of Americans who 
sympathized with the efforts to pull the nation out of 
the Depression - -even when they failed. Without a 
doubt, the New Deal's economic and social programs 
during these years cushioned the suffering inflicted by 
unemployment. 
The final conclusion addresses a vestige of the 
New Deal policies. Certain mindsets developed during 
the years of rampant unemployment that remain a part of 
public policies today. Since WW II, employment has 
been a priority for the United States government. This 
attitude has resulted in a relative tolerance of 





















Germany. The Germans will tolerate almost any level of 
unemployment in order to avoid inflation, which 
devastated their economy following WW I. 
After considering the host of variables in the 
unemployment situation, one can more clearly understand 
why Roosevelt failed to reduce unemployment to an 
acceptable level before WW II. In the early years of 
the Depression, policymakers attempted no comprehensive 
attack on unemployment. As the situation grew more 
desperate, it became more difficult to solve. 
Roosevelt's policies continually faced opposition from 
conservative isolationists and those calling for a 
balanced budget. The focus was, therefore, on relief 
for the unemployed, rather than job creation. Although 
the United States benefitted from many of the New Deal 
programs, the experiments in employment policy failed 
to meet the goals Roosevelt had set forth early in his 
























I TABLE 1 
TOTAL UNEMPLOYED WORKERS (AFL Estimates) 
I YEAR MONTH THOUSANDS YEAR MONTH THOUSANDS 
I 1937 JANUARY 9,241 1940 JANUARY 10,380 FEBRUARY 8,960 FEBRUARY 10,318 
MARCH 8,604 MARCH 10,027 
I 
APRIL 8,313 APRIL 9,953 
MAY 7,909 MAY 9,712 
JUNE 7,824 JUNE 9,273 
JULY 7,782 JULY 9,266 
I AUGUST 7,746 AUGUST 8,909 SEPTEMBER 7,513 SEPTEMBER 8,172 
OCTOBER 7,706 OCTOBER 7,845 
I NOVEMBER 8,479 NOVEMBER 7,790 DECEMBER 9,307 DECEMBER 7,603 
I 
1938 JANUARY 10,926 1941 JANUARY 8,659 
FEBRUARY 11,123 FEBRUARY 8,084 
MARCH 11,226 MARCH 7,540 
APRIL 11,065 APRIL 6,838 
I MAY 11,404 MAY 6,059 JUNE 11,400 JUNE 5,333 
JULY 11,274 




1939 JANUARY 11,192 







I SEPTEMBER 9,169 OCTOBER 8,895 
NOVEMBER 9,063 






I TABLE 2 
WORKERS EMPLOYED ON WPA: 1937-1941 
I YEAR MONTH THOUSANDS YEAR MONTH THOUSANDS 
I 1937 JANUARY 2,127 1940 JANUARY 2,136 FEBRUARY 2,145 FEBRUARY 2,243 MARCH 2,125 MARCH 2,204 
I 
APRIL 2,075 APRIL 2,002 
MAY 2,018 MAY 1,889 
JUNE 1,874 JUNE 1,658 
JULY 1,628 JULY 1,598 
I AUGUST 1,509 AUGUST 1,635 SEPTEMBER 1,454 SEPTEMBER 1,622 
OCTOBER 1,460 OCTOBER 1,694 
I NOVEMBER 1,501 NOVEMBER 1,723 DECEMBER 1,594 DECEMBER 1,781 
I 
1938 JANUARY 1,801 1941 JANUARY 1,815 
FEBRUARY 2,001 FEBRUARY 1,810 
MARCH 2,319 MARCH 1,679 
APRIL 2,538 APRIL 1,537 









1939 JANUARY 2,928 







I SEPTEMBER 1,654 OCTOBER 1,802 
NOVEMBER 1,877 
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